

The Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East Reconsidered : A Case Study of Saudi Arabia

Saud M. Al-Otaibi

*Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science,
College of Economics and Administration, King Abdulaziz University*

(Received on 27/11/1416; accepted for publication on 8/8/1417)

Abstract. The paper evaluates three common perspectives used by scholars to explain the resilience of Middle East monarchies: the intervention, cultural and functional. It shows the limitations of the three perspectives in explaining the resilience of the Al-Saud monarchy and proposes the statecraft perspective as an alternative explanation. Statecraft perspective, or leadership skills and techniques are the most important factors behind the creation and continuity of political systems in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East.

Introduction

The belief among political scientists that ruling monarchies are an "endangered species", [1, p.51], led them to pay little attention to studying the resilience of monarchies. However, the exceptional persistence of Middle East monarchies revived the interest in studying the resilience of monarchies. Several studies have tried to explain the phenomena. Among these studies are: "Absolutism and Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East." by Lisa Anderson (1988) [2], and "Durable and Non-Durable Dynasties: The Rashidis and Saudis in Central Arabia" by Madawi Al Rasheed (1992) [3]. Both studies tried to explain the resilience of Middle East monarchies by using three perspectives: the cultural, intervention and functional.

This paper has two goals. The first is to evaluate the utility of these perspectives in explaining the resilience of monarchy in the Middle East and the second is to introduce the statecraft perspective as an alternative explanation for the resilience of monarchy in the Middle East.

To achieve these goals, the paper chose the Al-Saud monarchy to be the focus of this study for the following reasons:

First, the durability of the Saudi political system is "extraordinary compared with nearly all the surviving monarchies in the area, especially considering the fluid, conflict-ridden nature of tribal traditional political culture in the Arabian Peninsula and the scale of social change which has been occurring there in the last half-century", [4, p169]. Secondly, the Al-Saud monarchy was one of three monarchies that existed in the Arabian Peninsula between 1902 and 1929, the other two being the Al-Rasheed and the Al-Hashemite monarchies. Since all three monarchies existed in the same area at the same time and shared the same cultural values, an opportunity is provided to test the utility of the three perspectives.

Consequently, the paper is divided into four sections. Section one provides a brief account of the internal and external settings in the Arabian Peninsula before the creation of the Al-Saud monarchy. Section two evaluates the intervention, cultural and functional perspectives and their utility in explaining the resilience of the Al-Saud monarchy, while section three presents the statecraft perspective as an alternative explanation of the Al-Saud monarchy. Finally, section four gives a summary and conclusion of the paper.

1. The Internal and External Settings

The interaction between a tribe and the outside communities is best considered under internal and external settings. Internal setting refers to matters concerning tribal members and other tribes within the Arabian Peninsula. Communications with societies outside the Peninsula region are external.

The internal setting

Before the creation of Saudi Arabia, the Arabian Peninsula was fragmented politically as well as geographically. At the local level, the Arabian Peninsula was divided between several tribal groups. A tribe constituted an autonomous political entity which resided in a specific geographical area called dira. Within the dira, the tribe had its own political, economic, and social rules. Politically, the tribe was ruled by a Shaykh who performed internal as well as external roles. Internally, the Shaykh played the role of a mediator and conciliator between disputing tribal members. The Shaykh did not make decisions alone but rather consult other members of the tribe about matters that concern the tribe [5]. On the inter-tribal level, the Shaykh represented his tribal views and demands and made decisions and treaties on behalf of his tribe.

Economically, the tribe was a self-sufficient unit and depended on the natural resources such as wells and villages found within its dira limits. Any encroachment into dira limits without prior permission from the tribe could lead to war [6].

Socially, tribal members interacted mostly among themselves and had distrust to the outside world. Tribal members treated each other equally and wealth was distributed equally among them. An assault on any tribal members from rival tribes meant an assault on the whole tribe and required collective response. Consequently, a quarrel or conflict could escalate into a large scale war [7, p.983].

On the national level a limited number of major tribal leaders who dominated tribal confederations were able to exercise power. Among these leaders were the Al-Rasheed and Al-Hashemite.

In short, the internal, social and political settings in the Arabian Peninsula were resistant to any attempt aimed at unifying the fragmented tribes under one political leadership. In addition, in such settings "allegiance had to be imposed and maintained and, perhaps most significantly, could be lost. Tribes or sections could leave alliances or confederations if they lost faith in or because dissatisfied with a particular ruler" [8, p.39].

The external setting

The Arabian Peninsula was an area for competition between the Ottoman empire and Britain. Both powers tried to enlist the support of Arabian leaders to serve their interest. Ottoman interest in the area stemmed from their desire to keep control of the two Islamic holy places (Makkah and Madinah) which legitimized their image as the protector of the Islamic world. In addition, their interest in the peninsula was related to their engagement in World War I and their desire to find military support bases in the Arabian Peninsula. On the other hand the British interest in the area was based on their goal of terminating the Ottoman empire and securing trade routes to and from India

The competition between the two rival powers led to a race aimed at winning the support of the leaders of the three dynasties that existed in the Arabian Peninsula, namely the Al-Saud, the Al-Hashemite and the Al-Rasheed. Consequently, all three dynasties received foreign support from either the Ottoman Empire or Britain and sometimes from both. So, the Ottoman provided the Al-Rasheed dynasty in the north of the peninsula with ammunition and financial assistance equal to 200 pounds per month since 1891 [3, p152], while Britain's financial assistance to the Al-Hashemite dynasty in the western part of the peninsula reached 125,000 pounds per month (9, p.228). Since the Al-Saud dynasty was growing in strength, both Ottoman empire and Britain attempted to enlist its support. Hence the Ottoman empire signed a treaty with Abdulaziz in 1914 which recognized him as Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of Najd. To counter this treaty, Britain established a relationship with Abdulaziz Ibn Saud and provided him with a subsidy of 5,000 pounds per month and 3,000 rifles [8, p.49].

After the First World War ended, Britain continued to provide support for all three dynasties. The Al-Hashemite dynasty received the lion share of the assistance [8, p.49]. The reason behind the British continued support for the three dynasties is stated in the following quotation:

“Arabian affairs were in a state of turmoil when the conflict ended. Of the three important Arabian powers, Abdulaziz Ibn Saud was in the worst position. Hussein had not come out too badly. His dreams of vast Arab empire had not been realized, but he was the monarch of the independent Kingdom of Hejaz, acclaimed by European powers, and invited to become an original member of the League of Nations. The House of Al-Rasheed was also regarded by the British with a good deal of sympathy, partly because of the old passion for a formal balance of power and partly because of the prejudices of various British officials, such as Gertrude Bell and Colonel Leachman, in favor of maintaining the bloody but picturesque dynasty as a makeweight against the dour Wahhabis” [10, p.727].

2. Explaining the Resilience of Monarchies

As mentioned above, three different perspectives were put forward by scholars to explain the resilience of monarchies in the Middle East. These are the cultural, foreign intervention and functional.

Cultural perspective

Although there are several variants of cultural explanations, they are all based on the assumption that monarchies lasted so long because there is a “fit” between monarchy as a political institution and the cultural values of Middle Eastern countries. Monarchies are “traditional and therefore congenial type of regime in Islamic world” [2, p.3].

Anderson criticized this perspective on two grounds. First, Middle East monarchies are no more part of their own culture than liberal democracies. Second, even if the Middle Eastern monarchies are traditional from a historical point of view, the cultural perspective still fails to explain the flexibility of Middle Eastern monarchs in non-traditional, modern social and political change [2, p.3].

Intervention perspective

According to this perspective, the resilience of monarchy in the Middle East is the result of foreign aid and support [3,2]. Monarchies which received foreign aid and support are the ones that survived while monarchies which did not get foreign aid and support perished.

The foreign intervention argument is not satisfactory in explaining the resilience of Middle eastern monarchies for the following reasons:

First, it cannot account for the collapse of monarchies despite massive foreign assistance and aid. For example, the Shah’s regime in Iran collapsed despite massive

American support. In addition, the Iranian case showed that foreign aid and support might undermine the legitimacy of the recipient regime and ultimately cause its collapse [11, p.338].

Secondly, the foreign intervention perspective does not explain why some monarchies lasted after they were relinquished by colonial powers, while others could not [2].

Functional perspective

Although the functional perspective acknowledges the role played by foreign intervention in the creation of monarchies, it attributes the resilience of monarchies to functional reasons. According to this perspective, monarchies lasted because they were needed in the process of nation building and state formation [2].

Like the other two perspectives, the functional perspective does not explain why in a situation in which more than one monarchy existed and operated in the same social and political conditions, one of them lasted while others could not. Moreover, "the state does not exist in any particular form or nature because of presumed functional need of systems, but by the actions of individuals and groups as they struggle to promote their interests and the values they hold dear" [12, p.217].

3. Alternative Explanation

From the discussions above, it can be seen that the cultural, foreign intervention, and functional perspectives are of limited utility in explaining the resilience of the Al-Saud monarchy, not only because of their above discussed weaknesses, but also because of the following:

1) The Al-Saud monarchy was one of three monarchies that existed in the Arabian peninsula. The fact that all three monarchies existed in the same area and the same time and shared the same cultural values excludes the cultural and functional perspectives as a useful explanation of the Al-Saud monarchy's resilience.

2) All the three monarchies received foreign aid and support. The Al-Saud monarchy which received the least aid [13, p.41,14, p.134], survived while the Al-Rasheed and Al-Hashemite monarchies perished. This excludes the foreign intervention explanation as a reason for monarchy survivals in the region.

Consequently, this paper argues that statecraft, or leadership skills and techniques [5], has more utility in explaining the continuity of political systems not only in the Middle East, but also in all countries. Throughout history, political leaders have been most important factors in the creation and stability of the political systems. The Mexican as well as the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions took place after the death of political

leaders in those countries [11, p.385]. The Rwandan civil war in 1994 started after the death of their political leader.

The importance of the political leader in the survival and continuity of the political system is even greater in the Middle East. This is because political leaders in this area possess more authority and autonomy than what is known in the west [16]. Khadra for example, investigated the impact of leadership, institution, and ideology on continuity of three Arab political systems: Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. The author found that leadership has more impact on continuity of the three Arab political systems than ideology or institution [17, p.108].

Razi (1987) attributes the collapse of the Iranian monarchy to the failure of the Shah to acquire legitimacy. He stated:

“The inability of the Shah to acquire adequate legitimacy in terms of its existing foundations or to develop an alternative legitimacy formula in terms of which his dictatorship could be justified brought down not only his regime but also the monarchical system....and further suggests that in systems similar to Iran substantial lack of legitimacy by political leaders may result in disappearance of the institutions closely associated with them” [18, p.460].

In short, this paper argues that King Abdulaziz's political skills and techniques were the main factors behind the resilience of the Al-Saud monarchy. King Abdulaziz's political skills made him as “an outstanding figure who at his death was the world's longest-established head of the state who not only reigned but ruled” [19, p.191]. Like any political leader, King Abdulaziz used a mix of three strategies to prolong his rule. These strategies are charisma, control and coercion [20] which are discussed next.

Charismatic strategy

The political and social fragmentation in the Arabian Peninsula was the biggest threat to the survivability of the Al-Saud monarchy. This in turn left King Abdulaziz with two options. The first was to fight the tribes that threatened his authority. The second was to attempt to find a way to unify these fragmented tribes and bring them under his control. The second option was more acceptable to King Abdulaziz because he did not have the military capabilities to destroy rival tribes. His followers numbered 50 men at that time [21, p.26] and he did not have the financial resources to attract tribal leaders [22, p.41].

He therefore adopted the charismatic strategy of uniting the tribes and bringing them under his control. Charismatic strategy “helps the leader gain the obedience of his subjects on the basis of the population's devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of the individual who personifies the regime or to the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him” [20, p.5].

King Abdulaziz's charismatic appeal was based on his military achievement and heroism [22, 23]. To reinforce his charismatic image, King Abdulaziz adopted Islam as a state ideology. He chose religion as the state ideology for the following reasons:

- 1) He was himself a strong adherent to Islamic principles. King Abdulaziz tried to imitate the Prophet in all of his actions and behavior [24, p.131].
- 2) Only Islam could bring the fragmented tribes under one political unit. Islam calls for equality and unity and rejects all sorts of discrimination. Accordingly, tribes of lower rank such as sections of the sedentary population and sheep and goat herders, joined King Abdulaziz [3, 156].
- 3) Tribes had a natural readiness to accept Islamic principles [25].
- 4) It legitimized King Abdulaziz's rule by depicting his territorial expansion as a holy mission aimed at purifying the Arabian peninsula from heresies and un-Islamic practices [25, p88].

To help tribes learn about Islam, King Abdulaziz built a series of settlements, each called a hijur. The name hijur has a religious connotation. It implies "an individual's obligation to migrate from the corrupted to the purifying existence, just as Prophet Mohammed's flight from Makkah to Madinah had been" [6, p.58]. This religious connotation made it obligatory for tribes to join him.

The hijurs not only helped in teaching the tribes Islam but also had the following results:

- 1) They helped to weaken the tribal dual attachments to tribe and dira and strengthen the bond between the residents of the hijurs who were called Ikhwan, or brothers.
- 2) They won King Abdulaziz the title of "the shaykh al-mashayikh" or the supreme leader over all tribes [7, p983].
- 3) Hijurs strengthened King Abdulaziz's military capabilities in terms of number and quality. In terms of numbers, his forces totaled over 60,000 [25, p.85], and in terms of quality, they were tough, aggressive and easily mobilized [26, p.190].

In short, King Abdulaziz's charismatic appeal as both a military hero and enforcer of religious doctrine won him two things. First, it strengthened his leadership and military capabilities. Second, it helped him in gaining the commitment and loyalty of the tribes that joined him.

Coercion strategy

To enhance and prolong his rule, King Abdulaziz had to deal with the external and internal threats to his rule and authority by adopting coercion strategy. The external threat stemmed from the Al-Rasheed dynasty in the northern part of the Peninsula and the Al-Hashemite dynasty in the Western Peninsula. Coercion was a necessary step not only because these two rival powers did not respond positively to his charismatic appeal but also because “the centralization of power resources is a violent process which, if successful, leads to the creation of order at a new, more expandable level” [28 , p.902]. Hence, King Abdulaziz used the Ikhwan army to defeat these rival powers.

After eliminating the external threats to his authority, King Abdulaziz was faced with new threat. This threat stemmed from some elements of the Ikhwan who adopted “uncompromising religious fanaticism” [28, p. 299] and started a rebellion against King Abdulaziz [29,28,4].

King Abdulaziz had no option but to use coercion to eliminate this internal threat to his authority. Hence, he raised an army and fought them and finally brought them under his control.

Administrative control strategy

After eliminating all sources of threat to his authority, King Abdulaziz adopted the administrative control strategy to institutionalize his authority. Administrative control strategy included the following:

First, the establishment of a network of town governors who ruled in his name: The town governors were composed of the Al-Saud family members. Saudi Arabia was divided into four provinces: Najd, ruled by King Abdulaziz's son Prince Saud; Hijaz, under the administration of King Abdulaziz's son Prince Faisal; Hasa, under the administration of Abdullah ibn-Jiluwi, cousin of King Abdulaziz, and Asir, governed by the nephew of King Abdulaziz, Prince Turki (30, p. 113).

Second, the creation of a unified law that covered all the state: Religious codes based on the teaching of sharia were made the law of the land throughout the country.

Third, connecting the parts of Saudi Arabia by a network of roads and mass media: This included the establishment of radio stations and telegraph lines in the major cities and towns to be used as a link between the King and the people [31, p.233].

Fourth, the creation of political institutions such as Majlis al-shura, Council of Deputies and Council of Ministers. The Majlis al-shura (the Advisory Council) was created in Hijaz in 1926. The purpose of creating it was to facilitate the integration of Hijaz into the Saudi Kingdom and to socialize the people into accepting the authority of

King Abdulaziz [32, p. 15]. It consisted of a viceroy (Prince Faisal), his advisors and six notables, and it was empowered to discuss such matters as the Viceroy chose to place before it.

The Council of Deputies was the second political institution created by King Abdulaziz in Hijaz in 1931. Its purpose was to coordinate government activities and help the King in making state policy [32, p.18]. Its responsibilities covered all parts of Saudi Arabia [32, p.15].

The Council of Ministers was the third political institution created by King Abdulaziz in 1953. The scope of the Council of Ministers covered all of Saudi Arabia and was charged with executive and legislative responsibilities [33, p42].

Fifth, instituting neotraditional corporatism as a mode of governance. Neotraditional corporatism as a mode of governance “draws heavily on indigenous cultural pattern of authority, interest aggregation, and leader-follower relations as a prime source of legitimation” [34, p1]. Hence, King Abdulaziz used consultation and his daily majlis to strengthen his ties with tribal, religious, and urban family leaders and to enhance his system legitimacy.

Consultations “for the bulk of the orthodox population became an accepted form of ‘democracy’ enshrined in the true spirit of Islamic values rooted in tribal notions of government’ [35, p.146]. Consequently, King Abdulaziz used to consult tribal, religious and urban family leaders before making major policies. This in turn helped him to avoid friction and establish a consensus and internal stability [35, p.146].

The daily majlis, on the other hand, is “an ancient tribal custom used by tribal leader as a form for debate and for resolving disputes” [35, p.146]. Consequently, King Abdulaziz used his daily majlis for the following purposes:

- a) To coopt tribal leaders and win their loyalties “the assurance of direct and frequent access to the King reinforced” the tribal leaderships’ involvement with Al Saud and strengthened their loyalty to it [32, p.90].
- b) To encourage participation and interest representation. Individuals and groups used the majlis to air their complaints, their personal problems and needs, and to “lobby worthy public causes” [36, p.165].
- c) To get people’s reaction to government policies and to be in constant communication with the masses [37, p.399].

In short, the various measures of control were aimed at institutionalizing and perpetuating King Abdulaziz’s authority over all parts of Saudi Arabia [23, p.97]. The creation of mass media and a network of roads not only facilitated communication between King Abdulaziz and his subjects, but also provided him with a means to

socialize people into accepting the new political system. Moreover, the creation of a network of governors and unified law, enhanced King Abdulaziz's authority and penetration over all society.

4. Summary and Conclusion

Between 1902 and 1926, three monarchies existed in the Arabian Peninsula, namely the Al-Hashemite, the Al-Rasheed and Al-Saud. Although all three monarchies shared the same cultural values, and received foreign aid, only the Al-Saud monarchy has survived to date. The resilience of the Al-Saud monarchy is the result of King Abdulaziz's statecraft and political skills. Through the adaptation of the three strategies of charisma, coercion and control, the King succeeded in overcoming his rivals and in institutionalizing his authority over the whole Arabian Peninsula.

The argument that statecraft is the crucial factor behind the resilience of Middle East monarchies, is supported by the recent studies which showed that the stability of the Arab states in the 1970s and 1980s was the outcome of the leadership skills and strategies [38, pxxvii]. In addition, it is supported by the fact that the "commitment of masses and other centers of powers to a particular ruler or clique can be fostered by a timely and judicious combination of leadership strategies" [20, p.9].

References

- [1] Eickelman, Dale F. "Kings And People: Oman's State Consultative Council." *Middle East Journal* , 38 (1984), 51-71.
- [2] Anderson, Lisa. "Absolutism and Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East." *Political Science Quarterly*, 106 (1988), 1-15.
- [3] Al Rasheed, Madawi. "Durable and Non-Durable Dynasties: The Rashidis and Saudis in Central Arabia." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 19 (1992), 144-158.
- [4] Hudson, Michael C. *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.
- [5] Kluck, P.A. "The Society and Its Environment." In: Richard F. Nyrop.(Ed.) *Saudi Arabia: A Country Study*. Washington: Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, 1984.
- [6] Piscatori, James. "Ideological Politics in Saudi Arabia." In: James P. Piscatori (ed.), *Islam in Political Process*, pp 56-72. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- [7] Peterson, J.E "Legitimacy and Political Change in Yemen and Oman." *ORBIS*, 1984, 971-998.
- [8] Peter Sluglett and Marion Faro-Sluglett. "The Precarious Monarchy: Britain, Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud and the Establishment of the Kingdom of Hijaz, Najid and its Dependencies,1925-1932." In: Niblock,T. (Ed.) pp. 6-57. *State, Society, and Economy in Saudi Arabia*. New York:St. Martin's Press, 1982.
- [9] Kostiner, J. "Transforming Dualities: Tribes and State Formation in Saudi Arabia." In: Philip S. Khoury, Joseph Kostiner, et al., (Eds.). *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.
- [10] Carmichael, Joel. "Prince of Arabs." *Foreign Affairs*, 120 (1942), 718-731.

- [11] Arjomand, S.A. "Iran's Islamic Revolution in Comparative Perspective." *World Politics*, 38 (1986), 383-414
- [12] Marcnin, Otwin. "The Nigerian State as Process and Manager: A Conceptualization." *Comparative Politics*, 20 (1988), 215-232.
- [13] الخترش، فوح (١٤٠١). "الحرب الحجازية التحديه : ١٩٢٤-١٩٢٥". دراسات الخليج و الجزيرة العربية ، العدد ٢٦ ، ص ص ٣٥-٧٣ .
- [14] المؤمن ، مكى حبيب (١٤٠١). "مولد العربية السعودية" دراسات الخليج و الجزيرة العربية ، العدد ٢٧ ، ص ص ١٣١-١٣٦ .
- [15] Eric, Davis and Nicolas Gavrielides, (Eds.) *Statecraft in the Middle East: Historical Memory & Popular Culture*. Florida: University Press, 1991.
- [16] Tein, Janice Gross. "Leadership in Peacemaking: Fate, Will, and Fortuna in the Middle East." *International Journal*, 37 (1984). "Leadership, Ideology, and Development in the Arab World," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 19 (1984), 228-39.
- [17] Razi, Hossein G. "The Nexus of Legitimacy and Performance: The Lessons of the Iranian Revolution." *Comparative Politics*, 19 (1987), 453-469.
- [18] McLoughlin, Leslie. *Ibn Saud: Founder of a Kingdom*. Houndmills : The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1993.
- [19] Nelson, Daniel. "Charisma, Control, and Coercion: The Dilemma of Communist Leadership." *Comparative Politics*, 16 (1984), 1-15.
- [20] Nyrop, Richard F. (Ed.) *Saudi Arabia: A Country Study*. Washington: Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, 1985.
- [21] Knauerhase, Ramon. *The Saudi Arabian Economy*. New York : Praeger Publishers, 1975.
- [22] Al-Yassini, Ayman. *Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985.
- [23] Bill, James A. and Leiden, Carl. *The Middle East: Politics and Power*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1974.
- [24] Weston, F. "Political Legitimacy and National Identity in Saudi Arabia: Competing Allegiance." *The Fletcher Forum*, (1987), 81-101.
- [25] Fabietti, Ugo. "Sedentisation as a Means of Detribalisation: Some Policies of the Saudi Arabian Government Towards the Nomads." In: T. Niblock, (Ed.). *State, Society, and Economy in Saudi Arabia*, pp. 186-197. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.
- [26] Cohen, Youssef , Brown, Brain R. and Organski, A.F.K. "The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order." *American Political Science Review*, 75 (1982), 901-10.
- [27] Kostiner, Joseph. "On Instruments and Their Designer: The Ikhwan of Najid and the Emergence of the Saudi State." *Middle Eastern Studies*, 21 (1985), 298-323.
- [28] Keefe, E. "National Security" In: Nyrop, Richard F., (Ed.): *Saudi Arabia: A Country Study*. Washington: Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, 1985.
- [29] Twitchell, K.S *Saudi Arabia*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953.
- [30] Rugh, William A. "Saudi Mass Media and Society in the Faisal Era." In: Willard A. Beling. *King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia*. London : Croom Helm, 1980, 125-145.
- [31] Niblock, T. (Ed.). *State, Society, and Economy in Saudi Arabia*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.
- [32] Al-Farsy, Foud. *Modernity and Tradition: The Saudi Equation*. London: Kegan Paul International., 1990.
- [33] Robinson, P. "Anatomy of a Neotraditional Corporatist State." *Comparative Politics*, 24 (1991), 1-20.
- [34] Plascov, A. *Security in the Persian Gulf 3: Modernization, Political Development, and Stability*. London: Gower for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982.
- [35] Abir, M. "The Consolidation of the Ruling Class and the New Elites in Saudi Arabia." *Middle East Studies*, 23 (1987), 150-171.
- [36] Pfaff, R. "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia." Ch.15, in Ismael, T. and Ismael, J.(Eds.). *Politics and Government in the Middle East and North Africa*. Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991.
- [37] Gause, F.G. "Sovereignty, Statecraft and Stability in the Middle East". *J. of International Affairs*, 45 (1992), 441-470.

بقاء الأنظمة الملكية في الشرق الأوسط دراسة للمملكة العربية السعودية

سعود محمد العتيبي

أستاذ مساعد بقسم العلوم السياسية

كلية الاقتصاد والإدارة، جامعة الملك عبد العزيز، جدة، المملكة العربية السعودية

(قُدِّم للنشر في ١٤١٦/١١/٢٧هـ، وقُبِّل للنشر في ١٤١٧/٨/٨هـ)

ملخص البحث: الهدف من هذا البحث هو تفسير بقاء الأنظمة الملكية في الشرق الأوسط، مستخدماً النظريات التالية:

- ١ — نظرية المساعدة الخارجية والتي تعزو بقاء هذه الأنظمة للمساعدات الخارجية.
- ٢ — النظرية الثقافية والتي تعزو بقاء هذه الأنظمة إلى التوافق بين ثقافة هذه الدول وبين النظام الملكي.
- ٣ — النظرية الوظيفية والتي تعزو بقاء هذه الأنظمة لحاجة هذه الدول الوظيفية إلى هذه النوعية من الأنظمة.

ولقد أظهر البحث محدودية هذه النظريات في تفسير بقاء النظام الملكي السعودي، وأظهر أن مهارة القائد السياسي والاستراتيجيات التي يتبناها تعتبر العامل الرئيسي وراء بقاء الأنظمة الملكية في الشرق الأوسط.